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DEFINABILITY IN THE REAL UNIVERSE ∗
S. BARRY COOPER †
Department of Pure Mathematics
University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, U.K.
Logic has its origins in basic questions about the nature of the real world and
how we describe it. This article seeks to bring out the physical and episte-
mological relevance of some of the more recent technical work in logic and
computability theory.
“If you are receptive and humble, mathematics will lead you by the hand.
Again and again, when I have been at a loss how to proceed, I have just had
to wait until I have felt the mathematics lead me by the hand. It has led me
along an unexpected path, a path where new vistas open up, a path leading to
new territory, where one can set up a base of operations, from which one can
survey the surroundings and plan future progress.”
– Paul Dirac, 27 November, 1975. In Paul A. M. Dirac Papers, Florida State
University Libraries, Tallahassee, Florida, USA, No. 2/29/17.
Keywords: Definability, computability, emergence, Turing invariance.
1. Introduction
Logic has an impressive history of addressing very basic questions about the
nature of the world we live in. At the same time, it has clarified concepts
and informal ideas about the world, and gone on to develop sophisticated
technical frameworks within which these can be discussed. Much of this
work is little known or understood by non-specialists, and the significance
of it largely ignored. While notions such as set, proof and consistency have
become part of our culture, other very natural abstractions such as that
of definability are unfamiliar and disconcerting, even to working mathe-
∗Article based on an invited talk at Logic Colloquium 2009, University of Sofia, Bulgaria,
August 5th, 2009.
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maticians. The widespread interest in Go¨del’s46,47 incompleteness results
and their frequent application, often in questionable ways, shows both the
potential for logicians to say something important about the world, while
at the same time illustrating the limitations of what has been achieved so
far. This article seeks to bring out the relevance of some of the more recent
technical work in logic and computability theory. Basic questions addressed
include: How do scientists represent and establish control over information
about the universe? How does the universe itself exercise control over its
own development? And more feasibly: How can we reflect that control via
our scientific and mathematical representations.
Definability — what we can describe in terms of what we are given
in a particular language — is a key notion. As Hans Reichenbach (Hilary
Putnam is perhaps his best-known student) found in the 1920s onwards,
formalising definability in the real world comes into its own when we need to
clarify and better understand the content of a hard-to-grasp description of
reality, such as Einstein’s theory of general relativity. Reichenbach’s seminal
work79 on axiomatising relativity has become an ongoing project, carried
forward today by Istvan Nemeti, Hajnal Andreka and their co-workers (see,
for example, Andre´ka, Madara´sz, Ne´meti and Sze´kely2). One can think of
such work as paralleling the positive developments that models of computa-
tion enabled during the early days of computer science, bringing a surer grip
on practical computation. But computability theory also gave an overview
of what can be computed in principle, with corresponding technical devel-
opments apparently unrelated to applications. The real-world relevance of
most of this theory remains conjectural.
The capture of natural notions of describability and real-world robust-
ness via the precisely formulated ones of definability and invariance also
brings a corresponding development of theory, which can be applied in
different mathematical contexts. Such an application does not just bring
interesting theorems, which one just adds to the existing body of theory
with conjectural relevance. It fills out the explanatory framework to a point
where it can be better assessed for power and validity. And it is this which
is further sketched out below. The basic ingredients are the notions of de-
finability and invariance, and a mathematical context which best describes
the scientific description of familiar causal structure.
2. Computability versus Descriptions
In the modern world, scientists look for theories that enable predictions,
and if possible predictions of a computational character. Everyone else lives
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with less constrained descriptions of what is happening, and is likely to
happen. Albert Einstein38 might have expressed the view in 1950 that:
When we say that we understand a group of natural phenomena,
we mean that we have found a constructive theory which embraces
them.
But in everyday life people commonly use informal language to describe
expectations of the real world from which constructive or computational
content is not even attempted. And there is a definite mismatch between
the scientist’s drive to extend the reach of his or her methodology, and the
widespread sense of an intrusion of algorithmic thinking into areas where it
is not valid. A recent example is the controversy around Richard Dawkins’
book32 on The God Delusion. This dichotomy has some basis in theorems
from logic (such as Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems): but the basis is more
one for argument and confusion than anything more consensual. Things
were not always so.
If one goes back before the time of Isaac Newton, before the scientific
era, informal descriptions of the nature of reality were the common currency
of those trying to reason about the world. This might even impinge on
mathematics — as when the Pythagoreans wrestled with the ontology of
irrational numbers. Calculation had a quite specific and limited role in
society.
3. Turing’s Model and Incomputability
In 1936, Turing101 modelled what he understood of how a then human
“computer” (generally a young woman) might perform calculations — lay-
ing down rules that were very restrictive in a practical sense, but which
enabled, as he plausibly argued, all that might be achieved with apparently
more powerful computational actions. Just as the Turing machine’s primi-
tive actions (observing, moving, writing) were the key to modelling complex
computations, so the Turing machine itself provided a route to the mod-
elling of complex natural processes within structures which are discretely
(or at least countably) presented. In this sense, it seemed we now had a way
of making concrete the Laplacian model of science which had been with us
in some form or other ever since the significance of what Newton had done
become clear.
But the techniques for presenting a comprehensive range of computing
machines gave us the universal Turing machine, so detaching computations
from their material embodiments: and — a more uncomfortable surprise
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— by adding a quantifier to the perfectly down-to-earth description of the
universal machine we get (and Turing101 proved it) an incomputable object,
the halting set of the machine. In retrospect, this becomes a vivid indication
of how natural language has both an important real-world role, and quickly
outstrips our computational reach. The need then becomes to track down
material counterpart to the simple mathematical schema which give rise to
incomputability. Success provides a link to a rich body of theory and opens
a Pandora’s box of new perceptions about the failings of science and the
nature of the real universe.
4. The Real Universe as Discipline Problem
The Laplacian model has a deeply ingrained hold on the rational mind. For
a bromeliad-like late flowering of the paradigm we tend to think of Hilbert
and his assertion of very general expectations for axiomatic mathematics.
Or of the state of physics before quantum mechanics. The problem is that
modelling the universe is definitely not an algorithmic process, and that
is why intelligent, educated people can believe very different things, even
in science. Even in mathematics. So for many, the mathematical phase-
transition from computability to incomputability, which a quantifier pro-
vides, is banned from the real world (see for example Cotogno24). However
simple the mathematical route to incomputability, when looking out at the
natural world, the trick is to hold the eye-glass to an unseeing eye. The
global aspect of causality so familiar in mathematical structures is denied
a connection with reality, in any shape or form. For a whole community,
the discovery of incomputability made the real universe a real discipline
problem. When Martin Davis30 says:
The great success of modern computers as all-purpose algorithm-
executing engines embodying Turing’s universal computer in phys-
ical form, makes it extremely plausible that the abstract theory
of computability gives the correct answer to the question What is
a computation?, and, by itself, makes the existence of any more
general form of computation extremely doubtful.
we have been in the habit of agreeing, in a mathematical setting. But in
the context of a general examination of hypercomputational propositions
(whatever the validity of the selected examples) it gives the definite im-
pression of a defensive response to an uncompleted paradigm change. For
convenience, we call this response31 — that “there is no such discipline as
hypercomputation” – “Davis’ Thesis”.
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The universal Turing machine freed us from the need actually embody
the machines needed to host different computational tasks. The importance
of this for building programmable computers was immediately recognised by
John von Neuman, and played a key role in the early history of the computer
(see Davis29). The notion of a virtual machine is a logical extension of this
tradition, which has found widespread favour amongst computer scientists
and philosophers of a functionalist turn of mind — for instance, there is
the Sloman and Chrisley90 proposition for releasing consciousness from the
philosophical inconvenience of embodiment (see also Torrance, Clowes and
Chrisley100). Such attempts to tame nature are protected by a dominant
paradigm, but there is plenty of dissatisfaction with them based on respect
for the complex physicality of what we see.
5. A Dissenting Voice . . .
Back in 1970, Georg Kreisel considered one of the simplest physical situ-
ations presenting mathematical predictive problems. Contained within the
mathematics one detects uncompleted infinities of the kind necessary for
incomputability to have any significance for the real world. In a footnote
to Kreisel56 he proposed a collision problem related to the 3-body problem,
which might result in “an analog computation of a non-recursive function”.
Even though Kreisel’s view was built on many hours of deep thought
about extensions of the Church-Turing thesis to the material universe —
much of this embodied in Odifreddi’s 20-page discussion of the Church-
Turing thesis in his book69 on Classical Recursion Theory— it is not backed
up by any proof of of the inadequacy of the Turing model built on a precise
description of the collision problem.
This failure has become a familiar one, what has been described as a
failure to find ‘natural’ examples of incomputability other than those com-
putably equivalent to the halting problem for a universal Turing machine
— with even that not considered very natural by the mainstream math-
ematician. One requirement of a ‘natural’ incomputable set is that it be
computably enumerable, like the set of solutions of a diophantine equa-
tion, or the set of natural numbers n such that there exists a block of
precisely n 7s in the decimal expansion of the real number pi — or like
the halting set of a given Turing machine. The problem is that given a
computably enumerable set of numbers, there are essentially two ways of
knowing its incomputability. One way is to have designed the set oneself to
have complement different to any other set on a standard list of computably
enumerable sets. Without working relative to some other incomputable set,
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one just gets canonical sets computably equivalent to the halting set of
the universal Turing machine. Otherwise the set one built has no known
robustness, no definable character one can recognise it by once it is built.
The other way of knowing a particular computably enumerable set to be
incomputable is to be able to compute one of the sets built via way one from
the given set. But only the canonical sets have been found so far to work in
this way. So it is known that there is a whole rich universe of computably
inequivalent computably enumerable sets — but the only individual ones
recognisably so are computably equivalent to the halting problem. Kreisel’s
failure is not so significant when one accepts that an arbitrary set picked
from nature in some way is very unlikely to be a mathematically canonical
object. It seems quite feasible that there is a mathematical theorem waiting
to be proved, explaining why there is no accessible procedure for verifying
incomputability in nature.
Since Kreisel’s example, there have been other striking instances of in-
finities in nature with the potential for hosting incomputability. In Off to
Infinity in Finite Time Donald Saari and Jeff Xia87 describe how one can
even derive singularities arising from the behaviour of 5 bodies moving
under the influence of the familiar Newtonian inverse square law.
There is a range of more complex examples which are hard to fit into
the standard Turing model, ones with more real-world relevance. There is
the persistence of problems of predictability in a number of contexts. There
is quantum uncertainty, constrained by computable probabilities, but host-
ing what looks very much like randomness; there are apparently emergent
phenomena in many environments; and chaotic causal environments giving
rise to strange attractors; and one has relativity and singularities (black
holes), whose singular aspects can host incomputability; . Specially inter-
esting is the renewed interest in analog and hybrid computing machines,
leading Jan van Leeuwen and Jiri Wiedermann106 to observe that “dots the
classical Turing paradigm may no longer be fully appropriate to capture all
features of present-day computing.” And — see later — there is mentality,
consciousness, and the observed shortcomings of the mathematical models
of these.
The disinterested observer of Martin Davis’ efforts to keep nature con-
tained within the Turing/Laplacian model might keep in mind the well-
known comment of Arthur C. Clarke16 (Clarke’s First Law) that:
When a distinguished but elderly scientist states that something is
possible, he is almost certainly right. When he states that some-
thing is impossible, he is very probably wrong.
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In what follows we look in more detail at three key challenges to the
attachment of Davis, and of a whole community, to the Turing model in
the form of Davis’ thesis.
There is a reason for this. At first sight, it may seem unimportant to
know whether we have computational or predictive difficulties due to mere
complexity of a real-world computational task, or because of its actual
incomputability. And if there is no distinguishable difference between the
two possibilities, surely it cannot matter which pertains. Well, no. Attached
to two different mathematical characterisations one would expect different
mathematical theories. And there is a rich and well-developed theory of
incomputability. This mathematics may well constrain and give global form
to the real-world which it underlies. And these constraints and structurings
may be very significant for our experience and understanding of the universe
and our place in it.
6. The Quantum Challenge
In the early days of quantum computing, there was some good news for
Davis’ thesis from one of its most prominent supporters. David Deutsch,
was one of the originators of the standard model of quantum computa-
tion. In his seminal 1985 article33 “Quantum Theory, the Church-Turing
Principle and the Universal Quantum Computer” in the Proceedings of the
Royal Society of London, he introduced the notion of a ‘universal quan-
tum computer’, and described how it might exploit quantum parallelism to
compute more efficiently than a classical Turing machine. But Deutsch is
quite clear that real computers based on this model would not compute any-
thing not computable classically by a Turing machine. And, of course, there
are many other instances of successful reductions of “natural examples” of
nature-based computational procedures to the Turing model.
But like Martin Davis, Deutsch35 is keen to take things further — a lot
further, attempting a reduction of human mentality to the Turing model in
a way even Turing in his most constructive frame of mind might have had
misgivings about:
I am sure we will have [conscious computers], I expect they will
be purely classical, and I expect that it will be a long time in the
future. Significant advances in our philosophical understanding of
what consciousness is, will be needed.
Be this as it may, there are aspects of the underlying physics which are
not fully used in setting up the standard model for quantum computing. It
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is true that measurements do play a role in a quantum computation, but in
a tamed guise. This is how Andrew Hodges explains it, in his article What
would Alan Turing have done after 1954? in the Teuscher volume:99
Von Neumanns axioms distinguished theU (unitary evolution) and
R (reduction) rules of quantum mechanics. Now, quantum comput-
ing so far (in the work of Feynman, Deutsch, Shor, etc) is based
on the U process and so computable. It has not made serious use
of the R process: the unpredictable element that comes in with
reduction, measurement, or collapse of the wave function.
The point being that measurements in the quantum context are intrusive,
with outcomes governed by computable probabilities, but with the mapping
out of what goes on within those probabilities giving the appearance of ran-
domness. There are well-established formalisations of the intuitive notion
of randomness, largely coincident, and a large body of mathematical the-
ory built on these (see, for example, Chaitin,15 Downey and Hirschfeldt,36
Nies67). A basic feature of the theory is the fact that randomness implies in-
computability (but not the converse). Calude and Svozil14 have extracted a
suitable mathematical model of quantum randomness, built upon assump-
tions generally acceptable to the physicists. Analysing the computability-
theoretic properties of the model, they are able to show that quantum ran-
domness does exhibit incomputability. But, interestingly, they are unable
as yet to confirm that quantum randomness is mathematically random.
But quantum mechanics does not just present one of the toughest chal-
lenges to Davis’ thesis. It also presents the observer with a long-standing
challenge to its own realism. Interpretations of the theory generally fail
to satisfy everyone, and the currently most widely accepted interpretations
contain what must be considered metaphysical assumptions. When we have
assembled the key ingredients, we will be in a position to argue that the
sort of fundamental thinking needed to rescue the the theory from such
assumptions is based on some very basic mathematics.
7. Schro¨dinger’s Lost States, and the Many-Worlds
Interpretation
One way of describing the quantum world is via the Schro¨dinger wave equa-
tion. What Hodges refers to above are the processes for change of the wave
equation describing the quantum state of a physical system. On the one
hand, one has deterministic continuous evolution via Schro¨dingers equa-
tion, involving superpositions of basis states. On the other, one has proba-
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bilistic non-local discontinuous change due to measurement. With this, one
observes a jump to a single basis state. The interpretive question then is:
Where do the other states go?
Writing with hindsight: If the physicists knew enough logic, they would
have been able to make a good guess. And if the logicians had been focused
enough on the foundations of quantum mechanics they might have been
able to tell them.
As it is, physics became a little weirder around 1956. The backdrop to
this is the sad and strange life-story of Hugh Everett III and his family,
through which strode the formidable John Wheeler, Everett’s final thesis
advisor, and Bryce DeWitt , who in 1970 coined the term ‘Many-Worlds’
for Everett’s neglected and belittled idea: an idea whose day came too late
to help the Everett family, now only survived by the son Mark who relives
parts of the tragic story via an autobiography42 and appropriately left field
confessional creations as leader of the Eels rock band.
Many-Worlds, with a little reworking, did away with the need to ex-
plain the transition from many superposed quantum states to the ‘quasi-
classical’ uniqueness we see around us. The multiplicity survives and per-
meates micro- to macro-reality, via a decohering bushy branching of al-
ternative histories, with us relegated to to our own self-contained branch.
Max Tegmark has organised the multiplying variations on the Many-Worlds
theme into hierarchical levels of ‘multiverses’, from modest to more radi-
cal proposals, with even the underlying mathematics and the consequent
laws of physics individuating at Level IV. Of course, if one does not bother
anymore to explain why our universe works so interestingly, one needs the
‘anthropic principle’ on which to base our experience of the world — “We’re
here because we’re here because we’re here because we’re here . . . ”, as they
sang during the Great War, marching towards the trenches. The attraction
of this picture derives from the drive for a coherent overview, and the lack
of a better one. As David Deutsch put it in The Fabric of Reality [34, p.48]:
. . . understanding the multiverse is a precondition for understand-
ing reality as best we can. Nor is this said in a spirit of grim de-
termination to seek the truth no matter how unpalatable it may
be . . . It is, on the contrary, because the resulting world-view is so
much more integrated, and makes more sense in so many ways,
than any previous world-view, and certainly more than the cyni-
cal pragmatism which too often nowadays serves as surrogate for a
world-view amongst scientists.
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Here is a very different view of the multiverse from the distinguished
South African mathematician George Ellis [40, p.198], one-time collaborator
of Stephen Hawking:
The issue of what is to be regarded as an ensemble of ‘all pos-
sible’ universes is unclear, it can be manipulated to produce any
result you want . . . The argument that this infinite ensemble actu-
ally exists can be claimed to have a certain explanatory economy
(Tegmark 1993), although others would claim that Occam’s razor
has been completely abandoned in favour of a profligate excess of
existential multiplicity, extravagantly hypothesized in order to ex-
plain the one universe that we do know exists.
The way out of this foundational crisis, as with previous ones in math-
ematics and science, is to adopt a more constructive approach. In this way,
one can combine the attractions of Tegmark’s97 Mathematical Universe Hy-
pothesis (MUH) with the discipline one gets from the mathematics of what
can be built from very small beginnings.
8. Back in the One World . . .
A constructive approach is not only a key to clarifying the interpretive
problem. Eliminating the redundancy of parallel universes, and the reliance
on the anthropic principle, also entails the tackling of the unsatisfactory
arbitrariness of various aspects of the standard model. The exact values
of the constants of nature, subatomic structure, the geometry of space —
all confront the standard model of particle physics with a foundational
problem. Alan Guth, inventor of the ‘cosmic inflation’ needed to make sense
of our picture of the early universe, asks:48
If the creation of the universe can be described as a quantum pro-
cess, we would be left with one deep mystery of existence: What is
it that determined the laws of physics?
And Peter Woit, in his recent book107 Not Even Wrong — The Failure of
String Theory and the Continuing Challenge to Unify the Laws of Physics,
comments on the arbitrary constants one needs to give the right values to
get the standard model to behave properly:
One way of thinking about what is unsatisfactory about the stan-
dard model is that it leaves seventeen non-trivial numbers still to
be explained, . . .
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Even though the exact number of constants undetermined by theory, but
needing special fine-tuning to make the standard model fit with observa-
tion, does vary, even one is too many. This dissatisfaction with aspects of
the standard model goes back to Einstein. Quoting from Einstein’s Auto-
biographical Notes [39, p.63]:
. . . I would like to state a theorem which at present can not be
based upon anything more than upon a faith in the simplicity,
i.e. intelligibility, of nature . . . nature is so constituted that it is
possible logically to lay down such strongly determined laws that
within these laws only rationally completely determined constants
occur (not constants, therefore, whose numerical value could be
changed without destroying the theory) . . .
What is needed is mathematics which does more than express mecha-
nistic relationships between basic entities. One needs theory expressed in
language strong enough to encapsulate not just relations on the material
world, but relations on such relations — relations which entail qualifications
sophisticated enough to determine all aspects of the our universe, including
the laws of nature themselves. Or, as Roger Penrose terms it [70, pp.106-
107], we need to capture Strong Determinism, whereby :
. . . all the complication, variety and apparent randomness that we
see all about us, as well as the precise physical laws, are all exact
and unambiguous consequences of one single coherent mathemati-
cal structure.
The article13 of Calude, Campbell, Svozil and Stefanescu on Strong deter-
minism vs. computability contains a useful discussion of the computability-
theoretic ramifications of strong determinism.
In the next section we examine some more approachable phenomena
than those at the quantum level. Even though the challenge these present
to Davis’ Thesis is less obvious than that of quantum uncertainty, they do
point us in the direction of the mathematics needed to make sense of strong
determinism.
9. The Challenge from Emergence
The waves on the seashore, the clouds scudding across the sky, the complex-
ity of the Mandelbrot set — observing these, one is made aware of limits
on what we can practically compute. The underlying rules governing them
are known, but that is not enough. When we talk about the problem of
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‘seeing the wood for the trees’ we are approaching the gap between micro-
and macro- events from another direction. Either way, there are commonly
encountered situations in which either reduction, or seeing the ‘big picture’,
entails more than a computation.
Although an interest in such things goes back to Poincare´ — we already
mentioned the 3-body problem — it was the second half of the twenti-
eth century saw the growth of chaos theory, and a greater of awareness
of the generation of informational complexity via simple rules, accompa-
nied by the emergence of new regularities. The most mundane and appar-
ently uncomplicated situations could provide examples — such as Robert
Shaw’s88 strange attractor arising from an appropriately paced dripping
tap. And inhospitable as turbulent fluids might appear, there too higher
order formations might emerge and be subject to mathematical descrip-
tion, as demonstrated by David Ruelle (see Ruelle86) another early pioneer
in the area. Schematic metaphors for such examples are provided by the
cellular automaton (CA) model, and famously by John Conway’s Game of
Life. Here is the musician Brian Eno41 talking in relation to how his creative
work on ‘generative music’ was influenced by ‘Life’:
These are terribly simple rules and you would think it probably
couldn’t produce anything very interesting. Conway spent appar-
ently about a year finessing these simple rules. . . . He found that
those were all the rules you needed to produce something that ap-
peared life-like.
What I have over here, if you can now go to this Mac computer,
please. I have a little group of live squares up there. When I hit go
I hope they are going to start behaving according to those rules.
There they go. I’m sure a lot of you have seen this before. What’s
interesting about this is that so much happens. The rules are very,
very simple, but this little population here will reconfigure itself,
form beautiful patterns, collapse, open up again, do all sorts of
things. It will have little pieces that wander around, like this one
over here. Little things that never stop blinking, like these ones.
What is very interesting is that this is extremely sensitive to the
conditions in which you started. If I had drawn it one dot different
it would have had a totally different history. This is I think counter-
intuitive. One’s intuition doesn’t lead you to believe that something
like this would happen.
Margaret Boden and Ernest Edmonds7 make a case for generative art,
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emergent from automata-like computer environments, really qualifying as
art. While computer pioneer Konrad Zuse was impressed enough by the
potentialities of cellular automata to suggest108 that the physics of the
universe might be CA computable.
A specially useful key to a general mathematical understanding of such
phenomena is the well-known link between emergent structures in nature,
and familiar mathematical objects, such as the Mandelbrot and Julia sets.
These mathematical metaphors for real-world complexity and associated
patterns have caught the attention of many — such as Stephen Smale6
and Roger Penrose — as a way of getting a better grip on the computabil-
ity/complexity of emergent phenomena. Here is Penrose71 describing his
fascination with the Mandelbrot set:
Now we witnessed . . . a certain extraordinarily complicated looking
set, namely the Mandelbrot set. Although the rules which provide
its definition are surprisingly simple, the set itself exhibits an end-
less variety of highly elaborate structures.
As a mathematical analogue of emergence in nature, what are the dis-
tinctive mathematical characteristics of the Mandelbrot set? It is derived
from a simple polynomial formula over the complex numbers, via the addi-
tion of a couple of quantifiers. In fact, with a little extra work, the quan-
tifiers can be reduced to just one. This gives the definition the aspect of
a familiar object from classical computability theory — namely, a Π01 set.
Which is just the level at which we might not be surprised to encounter
incomputability. But we have the added complication of working with real
(via complex) numbers rather than just the natural numbers. This creates
room for a certain amount of controversy around the use of the BSS model
of real computation (see Blum, Cucker, Shub and Smale6) to show the in-
computability of the Mandelbrot set and most Julia sets. The 2009 book
by Mark Braverman and Michael Yampolsky9 on Computability of Julia
Sets is a reliable guide to recent results in the area, including those using
the more mainstream computable analysis model of real computation. The
situation is not simple, and the computability of the Mandelbrot set, as of
now, is still an open question.
What is useful, in this context, is that these examples both connect
with emergence in nature, and share logical form with well-known objects
which transcend the standard Turing model. As such, they point to the role
of extended language in a real context taking us beyond models which are
purely mechanistic. And hence give us a route to mathematically capturing
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the origins of emergence in nature, and to extending our understanding
of how nature computes. We can now view the halting set of a universal
Turing machine as an emergent phenomenon, despite it not being as pretty
visually as our Mandelbrot and Julia examples.
One might object that there is no evidence that quantifiers and other
globally defined operations have any existence in nature beyond the minds
of logicians. But how does nature know anything about any logical con-
struct? The basic logical operations derive their basic status from their as-
sociation with elementary algorithmic relationships over information. Con-
junction signifies an appropriate and very simple merging of information,
of the kind commonly occurring in nature. Existential quantification ex-
presses projection, analogous to a natural object throwing a shadow on a
bright sunny day. And if a determined supporter of Davis’ Thesis plays at
god, and isolates a computational environment with the aim of bringing
it within the Turing model, then the result is the delivery of an identity
to that environment, the creating a natural entity — like a human being,
perhaps — with undeniable naturally emergent global attributes.
There are earlier, less schematic approaches to the mathematics of emer-
gence. Ones which fit well with the picture so far.
It often happens that when one gets interested in a particular aspect of
computability, one finds Alan Turing was there before us. Back in the 1950s,
Turing proposed a simple reaction-diffusion system describing chemical re-
actions and diffusion to account for morphogenesis, i.e., the development
of form and shape in biological systems. One can find a full account of the
background to Turing’s seminal intervention in the field at Jonathan Swin-
ton’s well-documented webpage96 on Alan Turing and morphogenesis. One
of Turing’s main achievements was to come up with mathematical descrip-
tions — differential equations — governing such phenomena as Fibonacci
phyllotaxis: the surprising showing of Fibonacci progressions in such things
as the criss-crossing spirals of a sunflower head. As Jonathan Swinton de-
scribes:
In his reaction-diffusion system [Turing] had the first and one of
the most compelling models mathematical biology has devised for
the creation process. In his formulation of the Hypothesis of Ge-
ometrical Phyllotaxis he expressed simple rules adequate for the
appearance of Fibonacci pattern. In his last, unfinished work he
was searching for plausible reasons why those rules might hold,
and it seems only in this that he did not succeed. It would take
many decades before others, unaware of his full progress, would re-
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trace his steps and finally pass them in pursuit of a rather beautiful
theory.
Most of Turing’s work in this area was unpublished in his lifetime, only ap-
pearing in 1992 in the Collected Works.104 Later work, coming to fruition
just after Turing died, was carried forward by his student Bernard Richards,
appearing in the thesis.80 See Richards81 for an interesting account of
Richards’ time working with Turing.
The field of synergetics, founded by the German physicist Hermann
Haken, provides another mathematical approach to emergence. Synergetics
is a multi-disciplinary approach to the study of the origins and evolution of
macroscopic patterns and spacio-temporal structures in interactive systems.
An important feature of synergetics for our purposes is its focus on self-
organizational processes in science and the humanities, particularly that of
autopoiesis. An instance of an autopoietic system is a biological cell, and
is distinguished by being sufficiently autonomous and operationally closed,
to recognisably self-reproduce.
A particularly celebrated example of the technical effectiveness of the
theory is Ilya Prigogine’s achievement of the Nobel Prize for Chemistry
in 1977 for his development of dissipative structure theory and its appli-
cation to thermodynamic systems far from equilibrium, with subsequent
consequences for self-organising systems. Nonlinearity and irreversibility
are associated key aspects of the processes modelled in this context.
See Michael Bushev’s comprehensive review of the field in his book12
Synergetics – Chaos, Order, Self-Organization. Klaus Mainzer’s book61 on
Thinking in Complexity: The Computational Dynamics of Matter, Mind,
and Mankind puts synergetics in a wider context, and mentions such things
as synergetic computers.
The emphasis of the synergetists on self-organisation in relation to the
emergence of order from chaos is important in switching attention from the
surprise highlighted by so many accounts of emergence, to the autonomy
and internal organisation intrinsic to the phenomenon. People like Pri-
gogine found within synergetics, as did Turing for morphogenesis, precise
descriptions of previously mysteriously emergent order.
10. A Test for Emergence
There is a problem with the big claims made for emergence in many different
contexts. Which is that, like with ‘life’, nobody has a good definition of it.
Sometimes, this does matter. Apart from which history is littered with
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instances of vague concepts clarified by science, with huge benefits to our
understanding of the world and to the progress of science and technology.
The clarification of what we mean by a computation, and the subsequent
development of the computer and computer science is a specially relevant
example here. Ronald C. Arkin, in his book [3, p.105] Behaviour-Based
Robotics, summarises the problem as it relates to emergence:
Emergence is often invoked in an almost mystical sense regarding
the capabilities of behavior-based systems. Emergent behavior im-
plies a holistic capability where the sum is considerably greater
than its parts. It is true that what occurs in a behavior-based
system is often a surprise to the system’s designer, but does the
surprise come because of a shortcoming of the analysis of the con-
stituent behavioral building blocks and their coordination, or be-
cause of something else?
There is a salutary warning from the history of British Emergentists,
who had their heyday in the early 1920s — Brian McLaughlin’s book.64 The
notion of emergence has been found to be a useful concept from at least the
time of John Stuart Mill, back in the nineteenth century. The emergentists
of the 1920s used the concept to explain the irreducibility of the ‘special
sciences’, postulating a hierarchy with physics at the bottom, followed by
chemistry, biology, social science etc. The emergence was seen, anticipating
modern thinking, as being irreversible, imposing the irreducibility of say
biology to quantum theory. Of course the British emergentists experienced
their heyday before the great quantum discoveries of the late 1920s, and
as described in McLaughlin,64 this was in a sense their undoing. One of
the leading figures of the movement was the Cambridge philosopher C. D.
Broad, described by Graham Farmelo in his biography of Paul Dirac [43,
p.39] as being in 1920 “one of the most talented young philosophers working
in Britain”. In many ways a precursor of the current philosophers arguing
for the explanatory role of emergence in the philosophy of mind, Charlie
Broad was alive to the latest scientific developments, lecturing to the young
Paul Dirac on Einstein’s new theory of relativity while they were both at
Bristol. But here is Broad writing in 1925 [10, p.59] about the ‘emergence’
of salt crystals:
. . . the characteristic behaviour of the whole . . . could not, even in
theory, be deduced from the most complete knowledge of the be-
haviour of its components . . . This . . . is what I understand by the
‘Theory of Emergence’. I cannot give a conclusive example of it,
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since it is a matter of controversy whether it actually applies to
anything . . . I will merely remark that, so far as I know at present,
the characteristic behaviour of Common Salt cannot be deduced
from the most complete knowledge of the properties of Sodium
in isolation; or of Chlorine in isolation; or of other compounds of
Sodium, . . .
The date 1925 is significant of course, it was in the years following that Dirac
and others developed the quantum mechanics which would explain much
of chemistry in terms of locally described interactions between sub-atomic
particles. The reputation of the emergentists, for whom such examples had
been basic to their argument for the far-reaching relevance of emergence,
never quite recovered.
For Ronald, Sipper and Capcarre`re in 1999, Turing’s approach to pin-
ning down intelligence in machines suggested a test for emergence. Part of
the thinking would have been that emergence, like intelligence, is something
we as observers think we can recognise; while the complexity of what we
are looking for resists observer-independent analysis. The lesson is to po-
lice the observer’s evaluation process, laying down some optimal rules for
a human observer. Of course, the Turing Test is specially appropriate to
its task, our own experience of human intelligence making us well-qualified
to evaluate the putative machine version. Anyway, the Emergence Test of
Ronald, Sipper and Capcarre`re84 for emergence being present in a system,
modelled on the Turing Test, had the following three ingredients:
(1) Design: The system has been constructed by the designer, by describ-
ing local elementary interactions between components (e.g., artificial
creatures and elements of the environment) in a language L1.
(2) Observation: The observer is fully aware of the design, but describes
global behaviors and properties of the running system, over a period of
time, using a language L2.
(3) Surprise: The language of design L1 and the language of observation
L2 are distinct, and the causal link between the elementary interactions
programmed in L1 and the behaviors observed in L2 is non-obvious to
the observer — who therefore experiences surprise. In other words,
there is a cognitive dissonance between the observer’s mental image of
the system’s design stated in L1 and his contemporaneous observation
of the system’s behavior stated in L2.
Much of what we have here is what one would expect, extracting the
basic elements of the previous discussion, and expressing it from the point
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of view of the assumed observer. But an ingredient which should be noted is
the formal distinction between the language L1 of the design and that of the
observer, namely L2. This fits in with our earlier mathematical examples:
the halting set of a universal Turing machine, and the Mandelbrot set,
where the new language is got by adding a quantifier — far from a minor
augmentation of the language, as any logician knows. And it points to the
importance of the language used to describe the phenomena, an emphasis
underying the next section.
11. Definability the Key Concept
We have noticed that it is often possible to get descriptions of emergent
properties in terms of the elementary actions from which they arise. For
example, this is what Turing did for the role of Fibonacci numbers in re-
lation to the sunflower etc. This is not unexpected, it is characteristic of
what science does. And in mathematics, it is well-known that complicated
descriptions may take us beyond what is computable. This could be seen
as a potential source of surprise in emergence.
But one can turn this viewpoint around, and get something more ba-
sic. There is an intuition that entities do not just generate descriptions of
the rules governing them: they actually exist because of, and according to
mathematical laws. And that for entities that we can be aware of, these will
be mathematical laws which are susceptible to description. That it is the
describability that is key to their observability. But that the existence of
such descriptions is not enough to ensure we can access them, even though
they have algorithmic content which provides the stuff of observation.
It is hard to for one to say anything new. In this case Leibniz was there
before us, essentially with his Principle of Sufficient Reason. According to
Leibniz60 in 1714:
. . . there can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true
proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so
and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in most
cases.
Taking this a little further – natural phenomena not only generate de-
scriptions, but arise and derive form from them. And this connects with a
useful abstraction – that of mathematical definability, or, more generally,
invariance under the automorphisms of the appropriate structure. So giving
precision to our experience of emergence as a potentially non-algorithmic
determinant of events.
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This is a familiar idea in the mathematical context. The relevance of
definability for the real world is implicitly present in Hans Reichenbach’s
work79 on the axiomatisation of relativity. It was, of course, Alfred Tarski
who gave a precise logical form to the notion of definability. Since then
logicians have worked within many different mathematical structures, suc-
ceeding in showing that different operations and relations are non-trivially
definable, or in some cases undefinable, in terms of given features of the
structure. Another familiar feature of mathematical structures is the rela-
tionship between definability within the structure and the decidability of
its theory (see Marker62), giving substance to the intuition that knowledge
of the world is so hard to capture, because so much can be observed and
described. Tarski’s proof of decidability of the real numbers, contrasting
with the undecidability of arithmetic, fits with the fact that one cannot
even define the integers in the structure of the real numbers.
Unfortunately, outside of logic, and certainly outside of mathematics,
the usefulness of definability remains little understood. And the idea that
features of the real world may actually be undefinable is, like that of in-
computability, a recent and unassimilated addition to our way of looking
at things.
At times, definability or its breakdown comes disguised within quite
familiar phenomena. In science, particularly in basic physics, symmetries
play an important role. One might be surprised at this, wondering where
all these often beautiful and surprising symmetries come from. Maybe de-
signed by some higher power? In the context of a mathematics in which
undefinability and nontrivial automorphisms of mathematical structures is
a common feature, such symmetries lose their unexpectedness. When Mur-
ray Gell-Mann demonstrated the relevance of SU(3) group symmetries to
the quark model for classifying of elementary particles, it was based on
lapses in definability of the strong nuclear force in relation to quarks of
differing flavour. The automorphisms of which such symmetries are an ex-
pression give a clear route from fundamental mathematical structures and
their automorphism groups to far-reaching macro-symmetries in nature. If
one accepts that such basic attributes as position can be subject to failures
of definability, one is close to restoring realism to various basic subatomic
phenomena.
One further observation: Identifying emergent phenomena with material
expressions of definable relations suggests an accompanying robustness of
such phenomena. One would expect the mathematical characterisation to
strip away much of the mystery which has made emergence so attractive to
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theologically inclined philosophers of mind, such as Samuel Alexander [1,
p.14]:
The argument is that mind has certain specific characters to which
there is or even can be no neural counterpart . . .Mind is, according
to our interpretation of the facts, an ‘emergent’ from life, and life
an emergent from a lower physico-chemical level of existence.
And further [1, p.428]:
In the hierarchy of qualities the next higher quality to the high-
est attained is deity. God is the whole universe engaged in process
towards the emergence of this new quality, and religion is the sen-
timent in us that we are drawn towards him, and caught in the
movement of the world to a higher level of existence.
In contrast, here is Martin Nowak, Director of the Program for Evolu-
tionary Dynamics at Harvard University, writing in the collection11 What
We Believe But Cannot Prove, describing the sort of robustness we would
expect:
I believe the following aspects of evolution to be true, without
knowing how to turn them into (respectable) research topics.
Important steps in evolution are robust. Multicellularity evolved at
least ten times. There are several independent origins of eusociality.
There were a number of lineages leading from primates to humans.
If our ancestors had not evolved language, somebody else would
have.
What is meant by robustness here is that there is mathematical content
which enables the process to be captured and moved between different
platforms. Though it says nothing about the relevance of embodiment or
the viability of virtual machines hostable by canonical machines. We return
to this later. On the other hand, it gives us a handle on representability of
emergent phenomena, a key aspect of intelligent computation.
12. The Challenge of Modelling Mentality
Probably the toughest environment in which to road-test the general math-
ematical framework we have associated with emergence is that of human
mental activity. What about the surprise ingredient of the Emergence Test?
Mathematical thinking provides an environment in which major ingre-
dients – Turing called them intuition and ingenuity, others might call them
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creativity and reason – are easier to clearly separate. A classical source
of information and analysis of such thinking is the French mathemati-
cian Jacques Hadamard’s The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical
Field,49 based on personal accounts supplied by distinguished informants
such as Poincare´, Einstein and Polya. Hadamard was particularly struck by
Poincare´’s thinking, including a 1908 address of his to the French Psycho-
logical Society in Paris on the topic of Mathematical Creation. Hadamard
followed Poincare´ and Einstein in giving an important role to unconscious
thought processes, and their independence of the role of language and me-
chanical reasoning. This is Hadamard’s account, built on that of Poincare´,73
of Poincare´’s experience of struggling with a problem:
At first Poincare´ attacked [a problem] vainly for a fortnight, at-
tempting to prove there could not be any such function . . . [quoting
Poincare´]:
“Having reached Coutances, we entered an omnibus to go some
place or other. At the moment when I put my foot on the step, the
idea came to me, without anything in my former thoughts seeming
to have paved the way for it . . . I did not verify the idea . . . I went
on with a conversation already commenced, but I felt a perfect
certainty. On my return to Caen, for conscience sake, I verified the
result at my leisure.”
This experience will be familiar to most research mathematicians – the
period of incubation, the failure of systematic reasoning, and the surprise
element in the final discovery of the solution: a surprise that may, over a
lifetime, lose some of its bite with repetition and familiarity, but which one
is still compelled to recognise as being mysterious and worthy of surprise.
Anyway, the important third part of the Emergence Test is satisfied here.
Perhaps even more striking is the fact that Poincare´’s solution had that
robustness we looked for earlier: the solution came packaged and mentally
represented in a form which enabled it to be carried home and unpacked
intact when back home. Poincare´ just carried on with his conversation on
the bus, his friend presumably unaware of the remarkable thoughts coursing
through the mathematicians mind.
Another such incident emphasises the lack of uniqueness and the special
character of such incidents – Jacques Hadamard49 quoting Poincare´ again:
“Then I turned my attention to the study of some arithmetical
questions apparently without much success . . . Disgusted with my
failure, I went to spend a few days at the seaside and thought of
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something else. One morning, walking on the bluff, the idea came
to me, with just the same characteristics of brevity, suddenness
and immediate certainty, that the arithmetic transformations of
indefinite ternary quadratic forms were identical with those of non-
Euclidian geometry.”
What about the design, and the observer’s awareness of the design?
Here we have a large body of work , most notably from neuro-scientists and
philosophers, and an increasingly detailed knowledge of the workings of the
brain. What remains in question – even accepting the brain as the design
(not as simple as we would like!) – is the exact nature of the connection
between the design and the emergent level of mental activity. This is an
area where the philosophers pay an important role in clarifying problems
and solutions, while working through consequences and consistencies.
The key notion, providing a kind of workspace for working through
alternatives, is that of supervenience. According to Jaegwon Kim [53, pp.14–
15], supervenience:
. . . represents the idea that mentality is at bottom physically based,
and that there is no free-floating mentality unanchored in the phys-
ical nature of objects and events in which it is manifested.
There are various formulations. This one is from the online Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy:
A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case
no two things can differ with respect to A-properties without also
differing with respect to their B-properties.
So in this context, it is the mental properties which are thought to supervene
on the neuro-physical properties. All we need to know is are the details of
how this supervenience takes place. And what throws up difficulties is our
own intimate experience of the outcomes of this supervenience.
One of the main problems relating to supervenience is the so-called
‘problem of mental causation’, the old problem which undermined the
Cartesian conception of mind-body dualism. The persistent question is:
How can mentality have a causal role in a world that is fundamentally
physical? Another unavoidable problem is that of ‘overdetermination’ – the
problem of phenomena having both mental and physical causes. For a pithy
expression of the problem, here is Kim54 again:
. . . the problem of mental causation is solvable only if mentality
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is physically reducible; however, phenomenal consciousness resists
physical reduction, putting its causal efficacy in peril.
It is not possible here, and not even useful, to go into the intricacies
of the philosophical debates which rage on. But it is important to take
on board the lesson that a crude mechanical connection between mental
activity and the workings of the brain will not do the job. Mathemati-
cal modelling is needed to clarify the mess, but has to meet very tough
demands.
13. Connectionist Models to the Rescue?
Synaptic interactions are basic to the workings of the brain, and connection-
ist models based on these are the first hope. And there is optimism about
such models from such leading figures in the field as Paul Smolensky,91
recipient of the 2005 David E. Rumelhart Prize:
There is a reasonable chance that connectionist models will
lead to the development of new somewhat-general-purpose self-
programming, massively parallel analog computers, and a new the-
ory of analog parallel computation: they may possibly even chal-
lenge the strong construal of Church’s Thesis as the claim that the
class of well-defined computations is exhausted by those of Turing
machines.
And it is true that connectionist models have come a long way since Turing’s
1948 discussion103 of ‘unorganised machines’, and McCulloch and Pitts’
1943 early paper65 on neural nets. (Once again, Turing was there at the
beginning, see Teuscher’s book98 on Turing’s Connectionism.)
But is that all there is? For Steven Pinker72 “. . . neural networks alone
cannot do the job”. And focusing on our elusive higher functionality, and the
way in which mental images are recycled and incorporated in new mental
processes, he points to a “kind of mental fecundity called recursion”:
We humans can take an entire proposition and give it a role in
some larger proposition. Then we can take the larger proposition
and embed it in a still-larger one. Not only did the baby eat the slug,
but the father saw the baby eat the slug, and I wonder whether the
father saw the baby eat the slug, the father knows that I wonder
whether he saw the baby eat the slug, and I can guess that the
father knows that I wonder whether he saw the baby eat the slug,
and so on.
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Is this really something new? Neural nets can handle recursions of vari-
ous kinds. They can exhibit imaging and representational capabilities. They
can learn. The problem seems to be with modelling the holistic aspects of
brain functionalism. It is hard to envisage a model at the level of neural
networks which successfully represent and communicate its own global in-
formational structures. Neural nets do have many of the basic ingredients of
what one observes in brain functionality, but the level of developed synergy
of the ingredients one finds in the brain does seem to occupy a different
world. There seems to be a dependency on an evolved embodiment which
goes against the classical universal machine paradigm. We develop these
comments in more detail later in this section.
For the mathematician, definability is the key to representation. As pre-
viously mentioned, the language functions by representing basic modes of
using the informational content of the structure over which the language
is being interpreted. Very basic language corresponds to classical computa-
tional relationships, and is local in import. If we extend the language, for
instance, by allowing quantification, it still conveys information about an al-
gorithmic procedure for accessing information. The new element is that the
information accessed may now be emergent, spread across a range of regions
of the organism, its representation very much dependent on the material
embodiment, and with the information accessed via finitary computational
procedures which also depend on the particular embodiment. One can ob-
serve this preoccupation with the details of the embodiment in the work
of the neuro-scientist Antonio Damasio. One sees this in the following de-
scription from Damasio’s book, The Feeling Of What Happens, of the kind
of mental recursions Steven Pinker was referring to above [25, p.170] :
As the brain forms images of an object – such as a face, a melody,
a toothache, the memory of an event – and as the images of the
object affect the state of the organism, yet another level of brain
structure creates a swift nonverbal account of the events that are
taking place in the varied brain regions activated as a consequence
of the object-organism interaction. The mapping of the object-
related consequences occurs in first-order neural maps representing
the proto-self and object; the account of the causal relationship
between object and organism can only be captured in second-order
neural maps. . . . one might say that the swift, second-order nonver-
bal account narrates a story: that of the organism caught in the act
of representing its own changing state as it goes about representing
something else.
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Here we see the pointers to the elements working against the classical in-
dependence of the computational content from its material host. We may
have a mathematical precision to the presentation of the process. But the
presentation of the basic information has to deal with emergence of a pos-
sibly incomputable mathematical character, and so has to be dependent on
the material instantiation. And the classical computation relative to such
information, implicit in the quotations from Pinker and Damasio, will need
to work relative to these material instantiations. The mathematics sets up a
precise and enabling filing system, telling the brain how to work hierarchi-
cally through emergent informational levels, within an architecture evolved
over millions of years.
There is some recognition of this scenario in the current interest in the
evolution of hardware – see, for example, Hornby, Sekanina and Haddow.52
We tend to agree with Steven Rose:85
Computers are designed, minds have evolved. Deep Blue could beat
Kasparov at a game demanding cognitive strategies, but ask it to
escape from a predator, find food or a mate, and negotiate the
complex interactions of social life outside the chessboard or ex-
press emotion when it lost a game, and it couldn’t even leave the
launchpad. Yet these are the skills that human survival depends
on, the products of 3bn years of trial-and-error evolution.
From a computer scientist’s perspective, we are grappling with the design
of a cyber-physical system (CPS). And as Edward Lee from Berkeley de-
scribes:59
To realize the full potential of CPS, we will have to rebuild com-
puting and networking abstractions. These abstractions will have
to embrace physical dynamics and computation in a unified way.
In Lee,58 he argues for “a new systems science that is jointly physical and
computational.”
Within such a context, connectionist models with their close relation-
ship to synaptic interactions, and availability for ad hoc experimentation,
do seem to have a useful role. But their are good reasons for looking for
a more fundamental mathematical model with which to express the ‘de-
sign’ on which to base a definable emergence. The chief reason is the need
for a general enough mathematical framework, capable of housing differ-
ent computationally complex frameworks. Although the human brain is an
important example, it is but one part of a rich and heterogeneous compu-
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tational universe, reflecting in its workings many elements of that larger
context. The history of mathematics has led us to look for abstractions
which capture a range of related structures, and which are capable of the-
oretical development informed by intuitions from different sources, which
become applicable in many different situations. And which provide basic
understanding to take us beyond the particularities of individual examples.
14. Definability in What Structure?
In looking for the mathematics to express the design, we need to take ac-
count of the needs of physics as well as those of mentality or biology. In
his The Trouble With Physics,92 Lee Smolin points to a number of deficien-
cies of the standard model, and also of popular proposals such as those of
string theory for filling its gaps. And in successfully modelling the physical
universe, Smolin declares [92, p.241]:
. . . causality itself is fundamental.
Referring to ‘early champions of the role of causality’ such as Roger Pen-
rose, Rafael Sorkin (the inventor of causal sets), Fay Dowker and Fotini
Markopoulou, Smolin goes on to explain [92, p.242]:
It is not only the case that the spacetime geometry determines
what the causal relations are. This can be turned around: Causal
relations can determine the spacetime geometry . . .
It’s easy to talk about space or spacetime emerging from something
more fundamental, but those who have tried to develop the idea
have found it difficult to realize in practice. . . .We now believe
they failed because they ignored the role that causality plays in
spacetime. These days, many of us working on quantum gravity
believe that causality itself is fundamental – and is thus meaningful
even at a level where the notion of space has disappeared.
So, when we have translated ‘causality’ into something meaningful, and the
model based on it put in place – the hoped-for prize is a theory in which
even the background character of the universe is determined by its own basic
structure. In such a scenario, not only would one be able to do away with
the need for exotic multiverse proposals, patched with inflationary theories
and anthropic metaphysics. But , for instance, one can describe a proper
basis for the variation of natural laws near a mathematical singularity,
and so provide a mathematical foundation for the reinstatement of the
philosophically more satisfying cyclical universe as an alternative to the
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inflationary big bang hypothesis – see Paul Steinhardt and Neil Turok’s
book95 for a well worked out proposal based on superstring theory.
15. The Turing Landscape, Causality and Emergence . . .
If there is one field in which ‘causality’ can be said to be fundamental, it
is that of computability. Although the sooner we can translate the term
into something more precise, the better. ‘Causality’, despite its everyday
usefulness, on closer inspection is fraught with difficulties, as John Earman
[37, p.5] nicely points out:
. . . the most venerable of all the philosophical definitions [of de-
terminism] holds that the world is deterministic just in case every
event has a cause. The most immediate objection to this approach
is that it seeks to explain a vague concept – determinism – in terms
of a truly obscure one – causation.
Historically, one recognised the presence of a causal relationship when a
clear mechanical interaction was observed. But Earman’s book makes us
aware of the subtleties beyond this at all stages of history. The success of
science in revealing such interactions underlying mathematically signalled
causality – even for Newton’s gravitational ‘action at a distance’ – has
encouraged us to think in terms of mathematical relationships being the
essence of causality. Philosophically problematic as this may be in general,
there are enough mathematical accompaniments to basic laws of nature
to enable us to extract a suitably general mathematical model of physical
causality. And to use this to improve our understanding of more compli-
cated (apparent) causal relationships. The classical paradigm is still Isaac
Newton’s formulation of a mathematically complete formulation of his laws
of motion, sufficient to predict an impressive range of planetary motions.
Schematically, logicians at least have no problem representing Newto-
nian transitions between mathematically well-defined states of a pair of
particles at different times as the Turing reduction of one real to another,
via a partial computable (p.c.) functional describing what Newton said
would happen to the pair of particles. The functional expresses the com-
putational and continuous nature of the transition. One can successfully
use the functional to approximate, to any degree of accuracy, a particular
transition.
This type of model, using partial computable functionals extracted from
Turing’s102 notion of oracle Turing machine, is very generally applicable to
basic laws of nature. However, it is well-known that instances of a basic
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law can be composed so as to get much more problematic mathematical
relationships, relationships which have a claim to be causal. We have men-
tioned case above – for instance those related to the 3-body problem. Or
strange attractors emergent from complex confluences of applications of ba-
sic laws. See recent work Beggs, Costa, Loff and Tucker,4 Beggs and Tucker5
concerning the modelling of physical interactions as computation relative
to oracles, and incomputability from mathematical thought experiments
based on Newtonian laws.
The technical details of the extended Turing model, providing a model
of computable content of structures based on p.c. functionals over the re-
als, can be found in Cooper.19 One can also find there details of how Emil
Post75 used this model to define the degrees of unsolvability – now known
as the Turing degrees – as a classification of reals in terms of their relative
computability. The resulting structure has turned out to be a very rich
one, with a high degree of structural pathology. At a time when primarily
mathematical motivations dominated the field – known for many years as a
branch of mathematical logic called recursive function theory – this pathol-
ogy was something of a disappointment. Subsequently, as we see below, this
pathology became the basis of a powerful expressive language, delivering a
the sort of richness of definable relations which qualify the structure for an
important real-world modelling role.
Dominant as this Turing model is, widely accepted to have a canonical
role, there are more general types of relative computation. Classically, allow-
ing non-deterministic Turing computations relative to well-behaved oracles
gives one nothing new. But in the real world one often has to cope with
data which is imperfect, or provided in real-time, with delivery of compu-
tations required in real time. There is an argument that the corresponding
generalisation is the ‘real’ relative computability. There are equivalent for-
malisations – in terms of enumeration reducibility between sets of data, due
to Friedberg and Rogers,45 or (see Myhill66), in terms of relative computabil-
ity of partial functions (extending earlier notions of Kleene and Davis). The
corresponding extended structure provides an interesting and informative
context for the better known Turing degrees – see, for example, Soskova and
Cooper.94 The Bulgarian research school, including D. Skordev, I. Soskov,
A. Soskova, A. Ditchev, H. Ganchev, M. Soskova and others has played a
special role in the development of the research area.
The universe we would like to model is one in which we can describe
global relations in terms of local structure – so capturing the emergence of
large-scale formations, and giving formal content to the intuition that such
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emergent higher structures ‘supervene’ on the computationally more basic
local relationships.
Mathematically, there appears to be strong explanatory power in the
formal modelling of this scenario as definability over a structure based on
reducibilities closely allied to Turing functionals: or more generally, freeing
the model from an explicit dependence on language, as Invariance under
automorphisms of the Turing structure. In the next section, we focus on
the standard Turing model, although the evidence is that similar outcomes
would be provided by the related models we have mentioned.
16. An Informational Universe, and Hartley Rogers’
Programme
Back in 1967, the same year that Hartley Rogers’ influential book Theory of
Recursive Functions and Effective Computability appeared, a paper,82 based
on an earlier talk of Rogers, appeared in the proceedings volume of the 1965
Logic Colloquium in Leicester. This short article initiated a research agenda
which has held and increased its interest over a more than 40 year period.
Essentially, Hartley Rogers’ Programme concerns the fundamental problem
of characterising the Turing invariant relations.
The intuition is that these invariant relations are key to pinning down
how basic laws and entities emerge as mathematical constraints on causal
structure. Where the richness of Turing structure discovered so far becomes
the raw material for a multitude of non- trivially definable relations. There
is an interesting relationship here between the mathematics and the use
of the anthropic principle in physics to explain why the universe is as it
is. It is well-known that the development of the complex development we
see around us is dependent on a subtle balance of natural laws and as-
sociated constants. One would like the mathematics to explain why this
balance is more than an accidental feature of one of a multitude, perhaps
infinitely many, randomly occurring universes. What the Turing universe
delivers is a rich infra-structure of invariant relations, providing a basis for
a correspondingly rich material instantiation, complete with emergent laws
and constants, a provision of strong determinism, and a globally originat-
ing causality equipped with non-localism – though all in a very schematic
framework. Of course, echoing Smolin, it is the underlying scheme that is
currently missing. We have a lot of detailed information, but the skeleton
holding it all together is absent.
However, the computability theorists have their own ‘skeleton in the
cupboard’. The modelling potential of the extended Turing model depends
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on it giving some explanation of such well-established features as quan-
tum uncertainty, and certain experimentally verified uncertainties relating
to human mentality. And there is a widely believed mathematical conjec-
ture which would rob the Turing model of basic credentials for modelling
observable uncertainty.
The Bi-Interpretability Conjecture, arising from Leo Harrington’s famil-
iarity with the model theoretic notion of bi-interpretability, can be roughly
described as asserting that:
The Turing definable relations are exactly those with information
content describable in second-order arithmetic.
Moreover, given any description of information content in second-order
arithmetic, one has a way of reading off the computability-theoretic def-
inition in the Turing universe. Actually, a full statement of the conjec-
ture would be in terms of ‘interpreting’ one structure in another, a kind
of poor-man’s isomorphism. Seminal work on formalising the global ver-
sion of the conjecture, and proving partial versions of it complete with key
consequences and equivalences, were due to Theodore Slaman and Hugh
Woodin. See Slaman’s 1990 International Congress of Mathematicians ar-
ticle89 for a still-useful introduction to the conjecture and its associated
research project.
An unfortunate consequence of the conjecture being confirmed would
be the well-known rigidity of the structure second-order arithmetic being
carried over to the Turing universe. The breakdown of definability we see
in the real world would lose its model. However, work over the years makes
this increasingly unlikely.
See Nies, Shore and Slaman68 for further development of the requisite
coding techniques in the local context, with the establishment of a number
of local definability results. See Cooper18,22 for work in the other direc-
tion, both at the global and local levels. What is so promising here is the
likelihood of the final establishment of a subtle balance between invariance
and non-invariance, with the sort of non-trivial automorphisms needed to
deliver a credible basis for the various symmetries, and uncertainties pe-
culiar to mentality and basic physics: along with the provision via partial
versions of bi-interpretability of an appropriate model for the emergence
of the more reassuring ‘quasi-classical’ world from out of quantum uncer-
tainty, and of other far-reaching consequences bringing such philosophical
concepts as epistemological relativism under a better level of control.
To summarise:What we propose is that this most cartesian of research
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areas, classical computability theory, regain the real-world significance it
was born out of in the 1930s. And that it structure the informational world
of science in a radical and revealing way. The main features of this informa-
tional world, and its modelling of the basic causal structure of the universe
would be:
• A universe described in terms of reals . . .
• With basic natural laws modelled by computable relations between
reals.
• Emergence described in terms of definability/invariance over the result-
ing structure . . .
• With failures of definable information content modelling mental phe-
nomena, quantum ambiguity, etc. . . .
• Which gives rise to new levels of computable structure . . .
• And a familiarly fragmented scientific enterprise.
As an illustration of the explanatory power of the model, we return to
the problem of mental causation. Here is William Hasker, writing in The
Emergent Self [50, p. 175], and trying to reconcile the automomy of the
different levels:
The “levels” involved are levels of organisation and integration, and
the downward influence means that the behavior of “lower” levels
– that is, of the components of which the “higher-level” structure
consists – is different than it would otherwise be, because of the
influence of the new property that emerges in consequence of the
higher-level organization.
The mathematical model, making perfect sense of this, treats the brain
and its emergent mentality as an organic whole. In so doing, it replaces
the simple everyday picture of what a causal relationship is with a more
subtle confluence of mathematical relationships. Within this confluence, one
may for different purposes or necessities adopt different assessment of what
the relevant causal relationships are. For us, thinking about this article,
we regard the mentality hosting our thoughts to provide the significant
causal structure. Though we know full well that all this mental activity
is emergent from an autonomous brain, modelled with some validity via a
neural network.
So one might regard causality as a misleading concept in this context.
Recognisable causality occurs at different levels of the model, connected
by relative definability. And the causality at different levels in the form of
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relations with identifiable algorithmic content, this content at higher levels
being emergent. The diverse levels form a unity, with the causal structure
observed at one level reflected at other levels – with the possibility of non-
algorithmic feedback between levels. The incomputability involved in the
transition between levels makes the supervenience involved have a non-
reductive character.
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